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Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner1
June 17, 2020

ABSTRACT
The Trump administration’s efforts to weaken regulations are in
tension with cost-benefit analysis, which in many cases supports
those regulations or otherwise fails to support the administration’s
deregulatory objectives. Rather than attempting to justify its actions
as a matter of policy preferences, the administration has responded
on multiple occasions by using Chevron to interpret statutes so as to
evade cost-benefit analysis. The statutory interpretation route, which
we call “Chevronizing” around cost-benefit analysis, creates novel
challenges for courts, as it pits traditional Chevron deference against
a trend in favor of requiring agencies to regulate based on costbenefit analysis as a matter of sound public policy. We evaluate these
efforts and conclude that in many of these cases, the Trump
administration’s attempts to leverage Chevron deference as a weapon
against cost-benefit analysis (and sensible policymaking) will expose
it to significant legal risk. We expect that courts will reject several of
these efforts. In the process, the Trump administration’s
machinations may have the effect of contorting how future courts
apply Chevron deference and how future administrations deploy it.

INTRODUCTION
The Trump administration has launched the most significant effort to
deregulate the economy since the Reagan administration.2 The parallels

1

Thanks to Kathrine Gutierrez, Jennifer Nou, Cass Sunstein, and workshop participants at
the University of Chicago for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Alex Aparicio,
Merav Bennett, Megan Delurey, Ugonna Eze, Adam Hassanein, Meghan Holloway, Angel
Russell-Johnson, and Justin Taleisnik for excellent research assistance.
2
David R. Henderson, Trump’s Deregulatory Successes, The Hoover Institution: Research
(July 7, 2019), at https://www.hoover.org/research/trumps-deregulatory-successes. But see,
Institute for Policy Integrity, Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, New York
University School of Law, at https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited
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between the two administrations are significant, but there are many
differences as well. Ronald Reagan ran for office on a promise to deregulate
the economy, but he also benefited from political tailwinds.3 A bipartisan
consensus held that the economy was overregulated and major deregulatory
legislation had already been enacted during the Carter administration. 4 Once
in office, Reagan appointed anti-regulatory officials to the regulatory
agencies, and, working through the Office of Management and Budget,
strengthened the White House’s control over the agencies.5 His most
significant achievement was the creation of centralized regulatory review that
required agencies to use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate regulatory options.6
The genius of this move was that cost-benefit analysis appeared to be a
neutral tool of policy analysis and yet seemed likely to produce a deregulatory
effect because it was widely believed, by people in both parties, that the
agencies regulated excessively.7
But while cost-benefit analysis remained in place through the next
four presidential administrations, it stopped exerting as much deregulatory
pressure after Reagan left office. It is possible that subsequent presidents put
Jan. 19, 2020) (observing that the Trump administration has lost 90% of litigation over
deregulation).
3
Henry Olsen, “The Working-Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of BlueCollar Conservatism,” (New York: Broadside Books, 2017).
4
“While the Republicans had a head start and a better public image on the issue of
deregulation, Democrats strived to catch up. By the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter was on the
offensive about deregulation, talking of sunset provisions for regulations and zero-based
budgeting as means to control the federal beast.” Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the
Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight a Revolution, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1990); see
also, John Howard Brown, Jimmy Carter, Alfred Kahn, and Airline Deregulation: Anatomy
of a Policy Success, 19 The Independent Review 85, 91-92 (Summer 2014).
5
See Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory
Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 37, 63-67 (2011); see also, Andrew
Rudalevige, Beyond Structure and Process: The Early Institutionalization of Regulatory
Review, 30 J. of Pol. Hist. 577 (2018); Edward P. Fuchs and James E. Anderson, The
Institutionalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 10 Public Productivity Review 25 (Summer
1987). But see, Martin Tolchin, The Rush to Deregulate, The New York Times, Apr. 21,
1983, at https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/21/magazine/the-rush-to-deregulate.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2020).
6
See Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). For a scholarly assessment,
see Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential
Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L & Pol. 483 (1988); see also, Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2279 (2001).
7
As Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) once said, “Regulators all too often encourage or
approve unreasonably high prices, inadequate service, and anti-competitive behavior. The
cost of this regulation is always passed on to the consumer. And that cost is astronomical.”
See, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight of Civil
Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedure, 94th Cong. 1 (1975). Link.
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less priority on deregulation; that regulations that survived the Reagan-era
housecleaning satisfied cost-benefit tests; and that, as new problems
emerged, from climate change to financial instability, it turned out that
additional regulation was cost-justified. While deregulation would continue
in some sectors, new regulations were found necessary in others.8
In the years leading up to Donald Trump’s electoral victory, regulated
industries expressed frustration with regulatory developments, including
financial regulation in the wake of the financial crisis, environmental and
energy regulation in response to climate change, and health care regulation
pursuant to the Affordable Care Act. Candidate Trump promised to
deregulate, and once in office, he initiated a deregulatory agenda.
But in a major irony from the standpoint of the Reagan era, costbenefit analysis now seems to be a hindrance to deregulation. The
deregulations that the Trump administration has proposed appear to violate
cost-benefit analysis—primarily because the Obama-era regulations that the
Trump administration seeks to repeal are backed by plausible cost-benefit
analyses.9 This represents a startling turn from the role that cost-benefit
analysis has typically played, and one that runs directly counter to the
caricatured notion of cost-benefit analysis as necessarily anti-regulatory.10
On previous occasions, when a new presidential administration has
decided to alter or undo the regulations promulgated by its predecessors, the
new administration has simply announced that it has different policy
priorities.11 But here, the cost-benefit infirmities of Trump’s deregulations
seem to have changed the equation. Whether due to the political cost of
deregulating in a cost-benefit unjustified manner, or to concern that the
regulations will be struck down by the courts, the Trump administration has
not appeared willing to bite the bullet and acknowledge that it has chosen
8

Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Regulation Under
Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 7 (2016).
9
A recent Council of Economic Advisers report claims that “the Trump Administration’s
new regulatory approach” has and will generate massive gains for the public. See Council of
Economic Advisors, The Economic Effects of Federal Deregulation Since January 2017: An
Interim Report 2 (2019). We are skeptical of this claim, which is based on a small number
of regulatory actions (that are supposedly representative of all of them) as well as statutes
and other actions outside the scope of this paper. But in any event the Report does not discuss
any of the deregulatory actions that we address in this paper, and so our conclusions are not
inconsistent with any of the specific claims that the Report attempts to document.
10
E.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING. PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005).
11
E.g., National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis
for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations.”).
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policies that fail cost-benefit analysis. Instead, it has responded in several
different ways. In a few cases, it has simply proposed implausible costbenefit analyses that do not survive serious scrutiny. But its most important
innovation has been to argue, in several important instances, that deregulation
is not merely a policy choice but is legally required by the underlying
regulatory statute. This approach has involved the manipulation of Chevron
deference—under which agencies have discretionary authority to set policy
when statutes are vague—to deprive agencies of the power to take into
account certain benefits generated by regulations. We refer to this tactic as
“Chevronizing around cost-benefit analysis.”
In the balance of this Article, we discuss the Trump administration’s
deregulatory approach, with a focus on Chevronizing around cost-benefit
analysis. In Part I, we describe four of the Trump administration’s most
significant deregulatory efforts and illustrate the various tactics used to
justify. In Part III, we evaluate these methods, assess their legality, and
discuss possible policy justifications for the Trump administration’s
approach. We conclude that the Trump administration’s approach—and in
particular, its efforts to Chevronize around CBA—is suspect from the
standpoint of law and policy.
I. TRUMP’S MAJOR DEREGULATIONS
Since taking office, President Trump has sought to roll back many of
the regulatory actions undertaken by the Obama administration. This
deregulatory effort has primarily involved notice-and-comment rulemaking
by administrative agencies that either reverses Obama-era regulations or
replaces them with substantially weaker rules. Most of this activity has
involved the environmental and power sectors. This includes Obama-era
rules on automobile fuel economy, hazardous pollutants, energy efficiency,
and—most notably—the Clean Power Plan, which was designed to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions through regulation of electricity generation. These
are areas in which the Trump administration has thus far made the most
progress in reversing Obama-era policy. In addition, unlike some of Trump’s
other deregulatory efforts,12 they involve Obama-era regulations that were
justified from a cost-benefit perspective. In this Part, we examine the four
most significant of these deregulations. Our goal is to expose the legal
mechanisms that the Trump administration has deployed to eliminate or
weaken these cost-benefit-justified regulations.
For example, Trump’s reversal of the Obama-era net neutrality rules. Restoring Internet
Freedom Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018). The Obama FCC never undertook a costbenefit analysis of the net neutrality rules.
12
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Mercury Regulation

The Trump administration’s effort to deregulate mercury emissions
from power plants is the latest step on a long and twisting path.13 In 1990,
Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Air Act, which required EPA to
regulate mercury emissions among other hazardous pollutants that it had
neglected. By the end of the 1990s, EPA had placed power plants on a list of
significant sources of mercury emissions, triggering a provision of the law
requiring these plants to be regulated under the demanding Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard. Before EPA had a chance
to promulgate a rule based on MACT for those plants, the Clinton
administration ended. The Bush EPA reversed course. Rather than issue
MACT standards, EPA delisted the power plants, which meant that MACT
was not required. The EPA proposed a more relaxed regulatory regime
known as the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), which imposed a cap-andtrade system. However, in 2008 the Bush rule was struck down by the D.C.
Circuit because EPA had not complied with the legally required procedure
for delisting a source of hazardous emissions.14
In 2012, the now-Obama EPA revived the Clinton approach and
issued MACT-based mercury-emission rules for coal- and oil-fired power
plants. These are known as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS),
but we will call it the mercury rule in order to avoid acronym overload. The
rule was based on studies that indicated that mercury emitted by power plants
found its way into water bodies, where it was consumed by fish that were
eaten by consumers. The mercury levels in these fish posed a threat to the
neurological development of fetuses carried by women who consumed the
fish. Thus, the EPA concluded that it was “appropriate and necessary” to
issue regulations, a finding required by section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air
Act. The mercury rule limited the amount of mercury emissions as well as
emissions of other hazardous substances, and imposed restrictions on the
operation of the power plants. In 2015 the Supreme Court struck down the
mercury rule.15 The problem was now that the EPA had failed to consider
cost when it determined that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate
the power plants back in 2000 and again in 2012 when it affirmed the earlier
13

For two useful overviews, see Keith Harley, Mercurial But Not Swift—U.S. EPA's
Initiative to Regulate Coal Plant Mercury Emissions Changes Course again as It Enters a
Third Decade, 86 CHI-KENT L. REV. 277 (2011); James L. Simpson, Why EPA’s Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards Matter—History and Health, 49 A.B.A. TRENDS 5 (Nov./Dec.
2017).
14
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
15
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711–12 (2015).
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determination.16 After conducting additional review, the EPA concluded that
the rule was lawful because, even taking costs into account, the benefits were
large enough to justify the regulation.17
This set the stage for the Trump administration. The Trump EPA
might have re-delisted power plants from the list of hazardous sources, but,
fearing a repetition of the Bush EPA’s debacle, it chose a different
deregulatory approach. Instead of delisting power plants, the Trump EPA
proposed to rescind its earlier finding that the mercury rule was “appropriate
and necessary.”18 Back in 2011, the Obama administration had issued a costbenefit analysis that showed that the rule generated benefits of $37 to $90
billion per year and costs of $9.6 billion.19 In 2016, it cited that cost-benefit
analysis to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that the EPA consider
cost when it made its “appropriate and necessary” determination. 20 The
Trump EPA concluded that the cost-benefit analysis in fact showed that the
regulation would not be “appropriate and necessary.”21 The reason was that
the benefit from the reduction of mercury emissions alone was only $4 to $6
million per year; the vast bulk of the total benefit was due to the reduction in
particulate matter emissions22 that would be generated by the same
regulation.23 Health benefits caused by reductions in particulate matter are
called “co-benefits,” because they result from the regulation but not from
Id. at 2711 (“The Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of
compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”).
17
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary To
Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420–01 (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Supplemental
Finding].
18
Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units – Reconsideration of Supplemental
Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2670 (proposed Feb.
7, 2019) [hereinafter Mercury Reconsideration].
19
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY
AND
AIR
TOXICS
STANDARDS,
ES-1
(Dec.
2011),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-mats_2011-12.pdf.
20
Supplemental Finding, supra note 17, at 24,425.
21
Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 2670 (“After considering the cost of
compliance relative to the HAP benefits of regulation, the EPA proposes to find that it is not
‘appropriate and necessary’ to regulate HAP emissions from coal- and oil-fired EGUs,
thereby reversing the Agency’s prior conclusion under CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) and
correcting flaws in the Agency’s prior response to Michigan v. EPA.”).
22
“Particulate matter” is the catch-all term for solid and liquid particles found in the air.
When inhaled, particulate matter can be extremely hazardous to human health. Particulate
Matter (PM) Basics, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulatematter-pm-basics (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). Reductions in particulate matter emissions
thus lead to high levels of regulatory benefits, as in this regulation.
23
See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 2676–77.
16
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reductions in the pollutant that is specifically being regulated. For decades,
agencies have treated co-benefits on equal footing with other types of benefits
when analyzing regulations. However, the Trump EPA argued to the contrary
that the co-benefits of regulating mercury could not be taken into account.
Without the co-benefits included, the cost of the regulation vastly exceeded
the relevant benefit—the reduction in mercury emissions.24 While the Trump
EPA has not moved to rescind the regulation, it has laid the basis for a
challenge by regulated parties.
The Trump EPA’s conclusion was based on a legal interpretation of
the Clean Air Act amendments rather than on a new cost-benefit analysis.
Section 112(n)(1)(A) states:
The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by
electric utility steam generating units [that is, power plants] of
pollutants listed under subsection (b) [mercury emissions] after
imposition of the requirements of this Act. … The Administrator shall
regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, if
the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary
after considering the results of the study required by this
subparagraph.25
The Obama EPA confusingly argued that the requirement to perform a study
of the health hazards resulting from mercury emissions after the imposition
of other parts of the law meant that Congress understood that those other parts
might have reduced harms caused by mercury emissions, and therefore that
the EPA should take into account co-benefits whenever it regulated.26 We are
not sure we understand this argument, but the EPA was on firmer ground
when it argued—citing the deference to which it is entitled under Chevron—
that it was free to take into account co-benefits when determining whether a
regulation was “appropriate and necessary.”27 This was consistent with longstanding executive branch policy that favors taking co-benefits into
account.28 The Trump EPA argued back that the purpose of section

24

See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 2675–78.
Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
26
Supplemental Finding, supra note 17, 81 Fed. Reg. at 24,438–39.
27
Supplemental Finding, supra note 17, 81 Fed. Reg. at 24,439.
28
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, September 17, 2003, available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ (“Your analysis should
look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of your rulemaking and consider any
important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks. An ancillary benefit is a favorable
impact of the rule that is typically unrelated or secondary to the statutory purpose of the
25
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112(n)(1)(A) is to authorize regulation of mercury emissions that are needed
to address the health hazards caused by those emissions.29 If the main effect
of the rule was to reduce particulate matter pollution, then it should have been
issued under the section of the Clean Air Act that authorizes the EPA to
regulate particulate matter. The agency presumably believed that a court,
under Chevron, would ultimately give deference to this interpretation.
B.

The Clean Power Plan

Thus far, the Trump administration’s most controversial regulatory
achievement is the EPA’s repeal of the Obama EPA’s Clean Power Plan30
(“CPP”) and its replacement with the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE)
initiative. The CPP was Obama’s most significant regulatory attempt to
reduce the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, with the
goal of slowing (or eventually stopping) climate change. The Clean Power
Plan required states to drastically reduce the quantity of greenhouse gases
emitted within their borders. Unlike other air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide
or particulate matter, carbon dioxide cannot be “captured” or eliminated at
the mouth of a smokestack or the tailpipe of a car. Once a fossil fuel has been
burnt, there is no reliable means (given current technology) for eliminating
the carbon dioxide produced. Accordingly, the CPP would have required
states to switch the mixture of fuels used to produce electricity within their
borders, decreasing the use of coal and increasing the use of (cleaner) natural
gas and renewables.31
The benefits that would have been generated by the CPP fall into two
categories. First, the CPP would have reduced total nationwide emissions of
greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, thus decreasing the effects of
climate change.32 The Obama EPA estimated the greenhouse gas reductions
would produce approximately $20 billion in annual benefits by 2030.33 In
rulemaking (e.g., reduced refinery emissions due to more stringent fuel economy standards
for light trucks)….”).
29
Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 18, 84 Fed. Reg. at 2676.
30
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015).
31
See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
383, 412 (2019) (describing and analyzing the Clean Power Plan).
32
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN FINAL RULE, at ES-10 (Aug. 2015) [hereinafter RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN],
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existingunits_2015-08.pdf.
33
Id. at ES-20, Table ES-7. This is based on a 3% discount rate. The Obama RIA does not
report cumulative benefits over a multi-year period. Instead, it reports only expected benefits
for particular years in the future, which is why we refer to the benefits in 2030 in the text
above.
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addition, the overall reduction in coal-fired power plants would have reduced
emissions of particulate matter and a number of other air pollutants that can
be highly dangerous to health.34 (As with the mercury regulation described
above, these were considered co-benefits.) These additional emissions
reductions were expected to yield approximately $24 billion in annual
benefits by the year 2030, for total of $44 billion in annual benefits.35 The
Obama EPA further predicted that the CPP would generate roughly $8.4
billion in annual costs.36 It thus appeared that the CPP would generate
benefits that substantially exceeded its costs.
Trump’s ACE plan, promulgated in July 2019, reverses Obama’s
37
CPP. Thus, in performing a cost-benefit analysis of the ACE plan, the
Trump EPA effectively re-calculated all of the costs and benefits of the CPP
in order to determine the economic effects of repealing that rule. Trump’s
economic analysis differed substantially from Obama’s. First, the Trump
EPA announced that it would include only domestic climate benefits in its
analysis, not world-wide climate benefits. That is, it counted only the benefits
that would be felt by people living within the United States.38 The domestic
costs of climate change are expected to be only a small fraction of the
worldwide costs, in part because the United States has only a small fraction
of the world’s population and a small fraction of its economic activity.39
Accordingly, the Trump EPA predicted that the CPP would have generated

34

Id. at ES-10.
RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 32,, at ES-20, Table ES-7. The EPA reported the
expected total benefits as a range of $34 to $54 billion (using a 3% discount rate). We report
the midpoint of that range here. Again, the Obama EPA did not calculate total estimated
benefits, only annual benefits for certain years.
36
Id. at ES-22, Table ES-9.
37
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 08, 2019)
[hereinafter Repeal of Clean Power Plan].
38
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED
EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY
GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS;
REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM, at ES-10 (2018) [hereinafter RIA FOR
PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201808/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf. See also Farber, supra note 31, at
415–17 (analyzing the requirement that agencies consider only domestic costs and benefits
contained in Executive Order 13,783). See generally Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and
Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 371 (2015).
39
Approximately 95% of the costs of climate change will likely be borne by people living
outside of the United States. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and
the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1591 (2011).
35
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only $500 million in annual benefits, a 95% reduction from the Obama EPA’s
calculation.40
In addition, the Trump EPA took a different approach from the
Obama EPA in deciding how to count the benefits from reductions in
particulate matter and other non-greenhouse gas pollutants. The Trump EPA
did not treat the co-benefits from reducing these pollutants as zero, as in the
mercury regulation. However, it counted an emissions reduction as a benefit
only if that reduction would not have been required under existing law.41 The
Obama EPA, by contrast, had counted an emissions reduction as a benefit if
the CPP had required reductions below current pollution levels.42 In other
words, imagine that the CPP would have effectively capped emissions of
particular matter in some area of the country at 50 units per year. If current
law limited emissions to 100 units per year, but polluters were currently
producing 150 units per year, the Obama EPA would have estimated the
benefits of the CPP based on a reduction of 100 units per year (150-50), while
the Trump EPA would have estimated those same benefits based on a
reduction of 50 units per year (150-100).43 After making this change, the
Trump EPA estimated the annual benefits from these reductions at
approximately $8.1 billion, down from the $24 billion estimated by the
Obama EPA.44
Despite these changes, the Trump EPA reported that its repeal of the
Obama CPP would produce costs well in excess of benefits. Repealing the
CPP was expected to produce net annual costs of approximately $4.5
billion,45 or $54 billion in total costs through the year 2037.46 The Trump
EPA also offered a variety of different options involving partial repeals of the
CPP; all of those options fail a cost-benefit test as well. Even despite the
differences in CBA methodology, the Trump EPA could not escape the
conclusion that the Obama CPP would produce benefits that exceeded its
costs.
40

RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at ES-13, Table ES-9.
RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at ES-11, ES-12.
42
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
43
To be clear, it is entirely possible that the Trump EPA’s approach—both with respect to
greenhouse gases and non-greenhouse gases—is superior and better-justified. Our goal here
is not to criticize the choices made by the Trump EPA in the course of its cost-benefit
analysis. Rather, our objective is to examine the effects of the Trump EPA’s decision on its
overall cost-benefit analysis, as well as the EPA’s legal approach in light of that cost-benefit
analysis. See infra.
44
RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at ES-12, Table ES-9. Here,
too, the EPA reported estimated annual benefits as a range from $4.9 to $11.4 billion, again
using a 3% discount rate. We report the midpoint of that range.
45
Id. at ES-16, Table ES-12. In between the promulgation of the CPP and Trump’s reestimation of its costs and benefits, the estimated costs also fell.
46
Id. This is the midpoint of a range of $3.1 to $6.8 billion, using a discount rate of 3%.
41
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To justify its deregulation, the Trump administration adopted a legal
tactic reminiscent of its Chevronizing approach to the mercury regulation.
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to establish a “standard of performance .
. . for any existing source”47 and then defines “standard of performance” to
mean:
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated.48
The Obama EPA argued that a “system of emission reduction” was capacious
enough to encompass plans that required electricity producers to switch some
production from coal-fired power plants to natural gas-fired plants or
renewable sources.49 That is, the Obama EPA believed that it could set
emissions guidelines “that would generally require power generators to
change their energy portfolios,” rather than requiring “technological or
operational measures that can be applied to or at a single source.”50
The Trump EPA disagreed with this position. It argued instead that
the text of the statute required that a “standard of performance” be applied
only to each “existing source” individually, rather than involving the
simultaneous shifting of capacity from “sources” (coal-fired plants) to “nonsources” (gas-fired plants and renewables). The EPA argued that this reading
was compelled by both the reference to “any existing source” and by the use
of the word “application,” which (it claimed) requires a particular object—an
individual power plant—to which the system of emission reduction would be
applied.51 Accordingly, the EPA concluded that the agency “is precluded
from basing [its regulatory approach] on strategies like generation shifting
and corresponding emissions offsets because these types of systems cannot
be put into use at the regulated building, structure, facility, or installation.”52
47

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
49
See Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 37, at 32,523.
50
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. at 48,037; see also U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing
Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,748. This is
sometimes referred to as regulation “outside of the fence line.”
51
Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 37, at 32,523.
52
Id. at 32,524.
48
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It is notable that after initially invoking its authority under Chevron
v. NRDC53 to justify its changing interpretation,54 the Trump EPA disclaimed
any reliance on Chevron in announcing the final rule. Instead, the agency
argued that the language of the Clean Air Act was unambiguous, and thus
that there was “no interpretive room on which the EPA could seek deference
for the CPP’s grid-wide management approach.”55 That is, the agency argued
that its hands were tied at Chevron Step 1: the statute did not permit the type
of regulation the Obama EPA had promulgated.
C.

CAFE Standards
1.

Federal Fuel Economy Rules

In 2012, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) and EPA together promulgated new corporate average fuel
economy standards (typically abbreviated as “CAFE” standards) that applied
to cars and light trucks beginning in Model Year 2017.56 CAFE standards are
imposed on a manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis: each automobile
manufacturer is required to meet a specified average fuel economy standard
across all of the automobiles sold by that manufacturer in a given year.
(Hence the “corporate” in “corporate average fuel economy.”) Manufacturers
can improve their average fuel economy by improving the fuel economy of
individual cars or simply by selling more small cars (which have higher fuel
economy) and fewer large cars (with lower fuel economy). Under the DOT
and EPA regulations, the formula for calculating the precise fuel economy
standard was complex and depended upon the price of oil in a given year, but
the effects were likely to be dramatic. The agencies anticipated that average
fuel economy across a manufacturer’s entire fleet of passenger cars would
rise from roughly 39 miles per gallon (“mpg”) in 2017 to roughly 55 mpg in
2025, and from roughly 29 mpg in 2017 for light trucks to roughly 40 mpg in
2025.57

53

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. at 48,039.
55
Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 51, at 32,532. In legal terms, this means that the
agency argued that the case should be decided at Chevron Step 1, whereby Chevron
deference does not apply to unambiguous legislative commands.
56
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 2017 and Later Model
Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012).
57
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2017-2025 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT
54
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The heightened fuel economy standards were expected to produce
significant net benefits. NHTSA estimated that the regulations would impose
costs of roughly $155 billion but create benefits of $630 billion, thus
producing net benefits of $475 billion.58 The majority of the costs were socalled “technology” costs—the costs of developing and installing more fuelefficient engines.59 But one of the consequences of improved fuel economy
is that individuals who own cars are likely to drive them more because they
are cheaper to operate. NHTSA thus estimated that the regulation would
create an additional $19 billion in costs from additional roadway congestion
(due to cars being driven more miles) and $9 billion in costs from additional
automobile accidents.60
On the benefits side, the primary expected benefit was a reduction in
lifetime fuel expenditures by the owners of more fuel-efficient cars, on the
order of $485 billion.61 But NHTSA estimated that there would be significant
additional benefits from the regulation as well, including benefits from
reduced greenhouse gas emissions ($49 billion) and reduced particulate
matter and sulfur emissions ($13 billion in total).62
In 2018, Trump’s EPA and NHTSA announced a proposal to repeal
the Obama-era CAFE standards rule with respect to Model Year 2021 and
later automobiles.63 Trump’s rule would effectively freeze the fuel efficiency
standards in place at 2020 levels, leaving them at roughly 44 mpg for cars
and 31 mpg for light trucks, rather than the continuing increases to 55 mpg
(cars) and 40 mpg (light trucks) scheduled under the Obama
Administration.64 Given the overwhelming net benefits that the Obama-era
rule was expected to produce, one might have imagined that a CBA of
TRUCKS, at 14-15 (Tables 3a & 3b) (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter OBAMA RIA],
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fria_2017-2025.pdf
58
This takes into account automobiles produced through Model Year 2025. Id. at 13 (Table
2).
59
These accounted for roughly $120 billion of the $155 billion in total costs. Id. at 49 (Table
13).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 50 (Table 13).
63
Envtl. Prot. Agency and Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., The Safer Affordable FuelEfficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018).
64
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AND NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE)
VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021 – 2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, at 18,
20
(Tables
1-7,
1-9)
(Jul.
2018)
[hereinafter
TRUMP
RIA],
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ld_cafe_co2_nhtsa_2127al76_epa_pria_181016.pdf.
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Trump’s repeal would have revealed expected costs—foregone benefits from
repealing the Obama standards—greater than expected benefits—avoided
technology costs and the like. But that is not what Trump’s preliminary CBA
claimed.
Instead, NHTSA and EPA calculated that repealing the Obama CAFE
standards would avoid $502 billion in costs and reduce benefits by only $326
billion, for a net gain of $176 billion.65 The CBA conducted by Trump’s
agencies considers a slightly different time period than the one conducted by
Obama’s agencies, so the comparison is not quite one-to-one. (For instance,
it is not necessarily significant that Trump estimated $502 billion in cost
savings while Obama estimated total costs of only $155 billion.) These minor
discrepancies aside, the end result was that the Obama EPA calculated that
the regulation would produce significant net benefits while the Trump EPA
calculated that the same regulation would produce significant net costs.
There are a number of overlapping reasons for this reversal. First, the
Trump administration estimated significantly higher technology costs than
Obama. For instance, the Obama NHTSA predicted roughly $90 billion in
technology costs for Model Year 2021-2025 automobiles.66 By contrast, the
Trump NHTSA estimated that technology costs would exceed $123 billion
across those five years.67 Second, the Trump EPA calculates carbon
emissions benefits and costs using the domestic cost of carbon, while the
Obama EPA used the global cost of carbon. Accordingly, where the Obama
EPA estimated benefits from higher CAFE standards of roughly $36 billion
across Model Years 2021-2025,68 the Trump EPA calculated the cost of
foregone climate benefits from those years as only $2.6 billion.69
Yet these discrepancies are not enough to account for the dramatic
divergence between the Trump and Obama conclusions regarding the value
of increased fuel economy standards. Instead, the difference is primarily
driven by assumptions and calculations regarding the ways in which cars will
be used and the number of miles they will be driven. Recall that the Obama
administration calculated that the total number of automobile miles driven
would increase slightly with higher fuel economy standards as automobiles
became cheaper to operate. In the Trump administration’s calculations, this
slight difference becomes an enormous gap. In the Trump analysis, increasing
fuel standards would lead to an enormous increase in the total number of
miles that people drive their cars each year. It is this analysis of how
65

Id. at 17 (Table 1-5). Avoided costs are effectively benefits, and foregone benefits are
effectively costs, hence the positive overall impact in this calculation.
66
OBAMA RIA, supra note 57, at 49 (Table 13).
67
TRUMP RIA, supra note 64, at 84 (Table 1-73).
68
OBAMA RIA, supra note 57, at 50 (Table 13).
69
TRUMP RIA, supra note 64, at 85 (Table 1-73).
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consumers will behave, and how many miles they will drive with looser or
tighter fuel economy standards, that propelled the Trump administration’s
contrary conclusion.
Accordingly, the Trump EPA calculated that the benefits of stricter
fuel standards (the Obama plan) would be much lower than the Obama EPA
had estimated. Whereas the Obama EPA calculated the fuel cost savings from
tighter fuel economy standards for Model Year 2021-25 automobiles at more
than $350 billion,70 Trump’s estimate comes in under $82 billion.71 The
reason, according to the Trump EPA, was that the benefits to consumers of
better fuel economy would be nearly outweighed by the fuel costs of the
additional miles those consumers would drive. The substantial reduction in
driving from weakening the fuel economy standards would create other
benefits as well, according to the Trump EPA.72 The Obama EPA estimated
that tighter fuel economy standards would yield small reductions in fatalities
from driving.73 Individuals would drive somewhat more, but the cars they
drove would be newer and smaller, and thus safer. By contrast, the Trump
administration estimated that loosening the fuel economy standards would
save 6,340 lives,74 which it valued at an additional $35.4 billion, because
people would be less likely to drive cars that were more expensive to
operate.75
How did the Trump EPA arrive at estimates of how much individuals
would drive that differed so widely from the Obama administration’s
estimates? According to the Trump EPA’s analysis, weakening fuel
economy standards would actually decrease the total number of cars on the
road, even though new cars would be cheaper to purchase. The reason,
70

OBAMA RIA, supra note 57, at 49 (Table 13).
TRUMP RIA, supra note 64, at 84 (Table 1-73).
72
If consumers would drive much more with stricter fuel standards (the Obama regulation)
than they would with weaker fuel standards (the Trump deregulation), this should also mean
that they gain much greater consumer surplus from driving with stricter fuel standards. If a
driver owns a car with better fuel economy and chooses to drive 20 miles instead of 10, the
driver must be getting some welfare benefit from the additional miles driven, despite the fact
that she is paying for more gas to drive the additional miles. Accordingly, if the Trump EPA
estimated that total vehicle miles driven would drop substantially under its deregulation, it
should have also estimated that total consumer surplus from driving would drop
substantially. But in fact, the Trump EPA’s estimate of consumer surplus from driving was
almost identical to the Obama EPA’s estimate. Compare OBAMA RIA, supra note 57, at 49
(Table 13), with TRUMP RIA, supra note 64, at 84 (Table 1-73) (showing roughly identical
numbers for consumer surplus in Model Years 2021-25). The Trump EPA does not attempt
to explain or justify how it arrived at this calculation, so it is difficult to evaluate. But on its
face, it appears implausible.
73
OBAMA RIA, supra note 57, at 50 (Table 13).
74
TRUMP RIA, supra note 64, at 92 (Table 1-77).
75
Id. at 84 (Table 13).
71
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according to the agency, is that the higher price of new cars (under the Obama
rule) would make used cars more valuable, and so more people would choose
to hold onto their used cars. That is, the Trump EPA estimated that higher
fuel economy standards would make new cars more expensive, leading to
fewer new cars on the road, which would in turn make used cars more
valuable, leading to more used cars on the road and fewer used cars being
scrapped. The net result, according to the Trump EPA, would be more total
cars on the road in a world with stricter fuel economy standards. However,
this conclusion contradicts basic principles of supply and demand.76 When a
product becomes more expensive, demand normally declines, and thus so
does production. In addition, studies of consumer behavior in response to
previous CAFE standards increases find that such increases typically reduce
the number of cars on the road.77
The Trump administration’s analysis further assumed that the
distance that a particular automobile is driven in a given year does not depend
upon how many cars there are on the road. So, in Trump’s analysis of the
Obama regulation, there are more total cars on the road, and consumers drive
each of those cars just as much as they would if there were fewer cars.78 In
other words, if the Obama regulation caused an individual to own two cars
instead of one, the total number of miles that individual drove in a given year
would double. This, too, runs contrary to both theory and evidence. The
supply of automobiles is only one input to the production of miles driven
(which one can think of as a good being produced). The supply of drivers is
another input, and one that this regulation leaves unchanged. Similarly left
unchanged by this regulation is the demand for driving. Thus, only if there
were many excess drivers and much unmet demand for driving would we
predict that the number of miles driven would increase linearly with the
number of cars on the road. And again, studies have demonstrated that driving
never increases one-for-one with increases in the number of automobiles.79

76

Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn & Virginia McConnell, Questions about the Trump
Administration’s Cost-Benefit Analysis for its Proposal to Freeze the CAFE Standards,
RESOURCES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/questionsabout-the-trump-administrations-cost-benefit-analysis-for-its-proposal-to-freeze-the-cafestandards/.
77
Id.
78
Institute for Policy Integrity, Comment Regarding The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,
https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Emissions_Standards_EPA_NHTSA_Comments_Oct
2018.pdf (October 26, 2018), at 79-80.
79
Id. at 57.
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These are hardly the only errors; the Trump EPA’s analysis includes other
implausible assumptions as well.80
The agency’s analysis is subject to judicial review under the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.81 If an agency decided to regulate (or deregulate) on the basis
of an obviously unjustified or nonsensical cost-benefit analysis—one that
ignored big costs or benefits, incorporated an implausible value of life or
discount rate, or exhibited any number of other problems—a court would
certainly strike it down as arbitrary and capricious.82 But here, in order to
understand why the Trump administration’s analysis is arbitrary and
capricious, a court must examine the economic modeling behind that analysis
and evaluate the quantitative arguments for and against Trump’s approach.
This is at the outer limits of what courts have been willing to do in the past.83
When courts have overturned regulations due to inadequate cost-benefit
analysis, they have most frequently done so when the agency simply did not
engage in a cost-benefit analysis at all84 or when the cost-benefit analysis
revealed on its face that the agency action was unjustified.85 We have found
instances in which a court has scrutinized an agency cost-benefit analysis at

80

One example is the analysis of how many more miles individuals would drive if their
automobiles were more fuel efficient. Trump’s analysis assumes that they would drive far
more miles than any existing study or data supports. Joshua Linn, Missing Fuel Cost Savings:
Some Clues Emerge, RESOURCES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/commonresources/missing-fuel-cost-savings-some-clues-emerge/. See also Joshua Linn, Alan
Krupnick, Benjamin Leard, & Virginia McConnell, Comments to NHTSA and US EPA on
the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026:
Passenger
Cars
and
Light
Trucks
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://media.rff.org/documents/Comments_10-25-18_EPA-NHTSA_final.pdf
(unpaginated).
81
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Other commentators agree with this stance.
Institute for Policy Integrity, supra note 78, at 10.
82
Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 22
GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015) (surveying a large number of cases in which courts have
evaluated agency cost-benefit analyses and finding that the appellate courts have rejected
many of them for faulty CBAs).
83
See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1358 (2016) (finding that agencies have won 92% of arbitrariness challenges at the Supreme
Court).
84
See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Michigan v.
EPA.
85
See, e.g., Corrosion-Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991)
(striking down the EPA’s proposed asbestos regulation because it would create costs in
excess of benefits); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003). See generally
Cecot &Viscusi, supra note 82, at 580-82 (describing cases in which the agency action has
been rejected due to its CBA).
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the level of detail that would be necessary to overturn this regulation, but they
are relatively uncommon.86
2.

California’s Clean Air Act Waiver

As it turned out, eliminating the Obama-era CAFE standards and
replacing them with much weaker fuel economy rules did not, by itself,
succeed in lowering national fuel-economy standards. The State of
California has authority under the Clean Air Act to promulgate air quality
standards that are more stringent than federal air quality standards.87 In order
to do so, California must obtain a waiver from the EPA that exempts it from
being preempted by federal rules. California has received dozens of such
waivers in the past, including waivers from the Obama administration that
remained in effect after the Trump EPA announced its intention to roll back
Obama-era CAFE standards. Pursuant to that waiver, California announced
an agreement with several major automakers that it would promulgate
Obama’s CAFE standards as its own, and that these automakers would abide
by them.88 Because of the size and importance of the California market, and
the difficulty of manufacturing different automobiles with different levels of
fuel economy for different states, the California rules would likely regulate
fuel economy for all cars manufactured and sold throughout the country.
In September 2019, the Trump administration announced that it was
withdrawing California’s preemption waiver.89 It made two arguments. First,
it argued that California did not need stricter fuel economy standards to meet
“compelling and extraordinary conditions,” as required by the Clean Air
Act.90 According to the Trump administration, California’s standards were
primarily intended to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and help curb
climate change. But, the Trump agencies argued, because climate change is
a global problem, and California’s carbon emissions do not remain in
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494 F.3d
188, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (scrutinizing the agency’s modeling choices and rejecting the
regulation on the basis that it does not articulate a reasonable explanation for dubious
modeling decisions); Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1218
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (same).
87
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
88
Office of Gov. Gavin Newsom, California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking
Framework Agreement on Clean Emission Standards,
(July 25, 2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/25/california-and-major-automakers-reachgroundbreaking-framework-agreement-on-clean-emission-standards/.
89
Envtl. Prot. Agency & National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed.
Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter SAFE One National Program Rule].
90
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
86
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California or affect only Californians, California cannot claim to have an
“extraordinary condition” that warrants particular standards.91
Second, the Trump administration argued that state fuel economy
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which
does not allow for state waivers.92 That law states:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter
is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt
or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or
average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an
average fuel economy standard under this chapter.93
This creates an obvious conflict with the Clean Air Act, which—in the
context of fuel economy standards—would seem to explicitly permit
precisely the sort of state action that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
prohibits. The only two courts to have confronted this issue both resolved it
in favor of the Clean Air Act (and thus in favor of the state seeking a
preemption waiver).94 Nonetheless, the Trump administration asserted that
those courts were wrong, and that states should be categorically preempted
from issuing their own fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act.95
Notably, the Trump administration claimed that it should be entitled
to Chevron deference with respect to both of these arguments. Like the
federal CAFE standards themselves, the rule withdrawing California’s
waiver was jointly promulgated by the EPA and NHTSA, the agencies
charged with administering the relevant sections of the Clean Air Act 96 and
Energy Policy and Conservation Act,97 respectively. Relatedly, the EPA and
SAFE One National Program Rule, supra at 89, at 51,339 (“The GHG emissions from
California cars are no more relevant to the pollution problem at issue (i.e., climate change)
as it impacts California than are the GHG emissions from cars being driven in New York,
London, Johannesburg, or Tokyo”).
92
Id. at 51,311.
93
49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).
94
Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007); Cent. Valley
Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007), as corrected (Mar.
26, 2008).
95
SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 89, at 51,314.
96
Id. at 51,351 (“Where states are now adopting standards for intents and purposes far
removed from NAAQS attainment planning or more specifically directed at global air
pollution, EPA as the agency charged with implementing the Clean Air Act is acting well
within that role in setting out an interpretation that aligns with Congressional intent.”) (citing
Chevron).
97
Id. at 51,320 (“However, to the extent there is any ambiguity, NHTSA is the expert agency
and its regulation adopted in this document is entitled to deference.”) (citing Chevron).
91
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NHTSA took the position that the withdrawal of California’s waiver was not
a “rule” under Executive Order 12,866.98 It thus declined to perform a costbenefit analysis.
The withdrawal of California’s Clean Air Act waiver is consistent
with our theme of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the Trump
administration has deployed a series of legal arguments, coupled with a claim
for Chevron deference, to evade consideration of the policy consequences of
its actions. We evaluate the merits of these legal arguments in greater depth
in the next Part.
D.

General Service Lamps

In the waning days of the Obama administration, the Department of
Energy issued a regulation that would have banned the sale of traditional
incandescent light bulbs in 2020.99 The regulation, along with the 2007 law
that authorized it, led to the rapid growth of a market in energy-efficient light
bulbs, including fluorescent, halogen, and LED.100 However, demand for the
cheaper, less efficient incandescent light bulb remained strong, and the
industry opposed the Obama regulation.101 In September 2019, the
Department of Energy issued a final rule that withdrew the Obama
regulation.102
The 2019 regulation was accompanied by a quite mysterious costbenefit analysis that purported to show that the regulation would reduce costs.
Based on the industry’s “confidential estimates of total domestic shipments
for the years 2015 to 2018” (the commitment to data transparency having
been temporarily forgotten),103 DOE argued that its regulation would reduce
costs in the form of “reduction in uncertainty” equal to roughly $50 million
to $200 million per year.104 As far as we can understand, the “reduction in
uncertainty” referred to uncertainty about whether DOE itself would
Id. at 51,352 (“EPA’s action here, however, is not a rule as defined by Executive Order
12866, consistent with its previous actions on waiver requests, and is therefore exempt from
review by the Office of Management and Budget as required for rules and regulations by
Executive Order 12866.”).
99
U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
General Service Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 19, 2017); U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy
Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service Lamps, 82 Fed.
Reg. 7322 (Jan. 19, 2017).
100
Nadja Popovich, America’s Light Bulb Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/08/climate/light-bulb-efficiency.html.
101
Id.
102
U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Definition for General Service
Lamps, 84 Fed. Reg. 46,661 (Sept. 5, 2019).
103
Id. at 46,674.
104
Id. at 46,674.
98
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ultimately decide on a new efficiency rule that allowed the sale of
incandescent light bulbs or instead trigger the statute’s backstop (which
would have barred traditional incandescent bulbs). Because the industry
cannot predict what DOE will do, it must be prepared to deliver a large
volume of light bulbs that will satisfy demand regardless of what happens,
and this of course would be larger than if industry knew that incandescent
light bulbs would be barred or not. DOE further rejected commenters’
concerns that its regulation would cause environmental harm on the ground
that it has not yet determined what the energy conservation standard will
be.105
It is hard to make sense of this analysis. The practical effect of the
regulation is to allow incandescent light bulbs to be sold in 2020. A costbenefit analysis would estimate the effects on the environment and compare
them to the consumer surplus from sales of incandescent bulbs. Since this
analysis has not been performed, we do not know whether withdrawal would
be cost-justified.106 But the effect on inventory is second-order concern, and
the argument that the regulation has no environmental effect because DOE
has not yet decided what some future conservations standard will be is
disingenuous.
II. CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA
The preceding examples demonstrate that CBA is not as malleable as
some of its critics have contended.107 For its repeals of the Obama-era
mercury regulation and the Clean Power Plan, the Trump EPA was able to
massage some of the numbers at the margin, but could not bring itself to argue
that the new mercury and CPP regulations were cost-justified. With respect
to the repeal of Obama’s fuel economy and general service lamp standards,
the Trump EPA did gin up phony CBAs, but their phoniness is plain to
anyone who cares to examine them. We suspect that agency officials worried
in these two cases that a phony CBA would invite a hostile judicial or public
response. While these concerns did not stop the EPA and DOT from issuing
the CAFE regulation, or the DOE from issuing the general lamps regulation,
the transparently erroneous CBAs make the regulations vulnerable to such
challenges.

105

Id. at 46,671.
The Obama regulation did not include a cost-benefit analysis on the ground that the
regulation was not a “major regulation.”
107
But see, e.g., Farber, supra note 31, at 432 (“On the contrary, the experience of the Trump
Administration may strengthen the argument that cost- benefit analysis is too malleable to
be considered reliable.”).
106
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By way of contrast, it is notable that the Trump administration has
made most of its significant deregulatory inroads in areas where CBA has not
traditionally been required, or in ways that are not normally subject to CBA.
Thus, for example, the reduction of resources for enforcement is not subject
to a cost-benefit requirement;108 nor is the reduction in reliance on scientific
advisory boards.109 The withdrawal of regulations under the Congressional
Review Act does not require a CBA.110 The FCC was able to withdraw
Obama’s net neutrality regulation without offering a CBA.111 The Trump
administration’s recent revision of regulations for implementing the
Endangered Species Act also involved a regulatory area in which agencies
have not used cost-benefit analysis and are prohibited by statute from taking
economic considerations into account.112 And the administration’s
immigration-related actions, including the withdrawal of the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals program, have generally not required CBAs for
various reasons—in the case of DACA, for example, because the
administration merely abandoned the Obama administration’s decision not to
enforce certain laws.113 Where CBA is required, the administration that has
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Alex Leary, Trump Administration Pushes to Deregulate With Less Enforcement, WALL
ST. J. (June 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-pushes-toderegulate-with-less-enforcement-11561291201 (noting that President Trump has attempted
to deregulate “by not hiring people to do the work of enforcing rules that are on the books”).
109
Jill Colvin, Trump Aims to Slash Number of Federal Advisory Committees, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 14, 2019), https://apnews.com/4e36550332c74894b8b87f4ed51aafff.
110
5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808. Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), Congress can
overturn a proposed agency rule by a joint resolution of disapproval. Congress does not need
to justify its decision with cost-benefit analysis. The 115th Congress (2017-2018) overturned
16 rules under the CRA, whereas only one rule had previously been overturned since the
law’s passage in 1996. MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV.,
IF10023,
THE
CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW
ACT
(CRA)
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10023.pdf.
111
Historically, independent agencies such as the FCC have not been subject to the same
CBA requirements as traditional executive branch agencies. According to one analysis,
“Section 1(b)(6) of E.O. 12866. E.O. 12866, like its predecessor orders that were issued by
President Ronald Reagan (E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12498), does not apply the cost-benefit
analysis or OIRA review to independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve
Board and Securities and Exchange Commission.” CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056,
COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS 4 n. 23 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf.
112
Dept. of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service & Dept. of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the
Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020,
45,024–25 (Aug. 27, 2019). .
113
The cost-benefit test of E.O. 12866 applies to “regulatory actions,” § 6(a)(3)(C), defined
as an actions leading up to a final rule or regulation designed to have the effect of law, § 3(d),
(e). Thus, it does not apply to enforcement decisions.
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had to work around CBA rather than disregard it completely. CBA has
offered friction against the Trump administration’s deregulatory goals.
The Trump administration has responded to these frictions with a
variety of tactics designed to evade or frustrate cost-benefit analysis. Some
of these tactics are straightforward and relatively well understood. Others are
innovations. In the sections that follow, we categorize these tactics and
evaluate their legality. Our conclusion is that most of them are illegal, or
should be held to be illegal. But cracking down on these actions would, in
some cases, require courts to subject the Trump administration’s actions to a
level of scrutiny that they have not traditionally been willing to apply to
administrative action.
In the case of mercury and the Clean Power Plan, the administration
tried to evade CBA rather than falsify it. Its strategies in both cases involved
what we call “Chevronizing around CBA”—using the executive branch’s
authority over legal interpretation to evade or nullify the results of a costbenefit analysis. In the mercury case, the administration argued that while the
Obama-era mercury regulation generates benefits greater than the costs, some
of those benefits—the “co-benefits”—did not count because the agency was
legally prohibited from issuing a mercury regulation unless the mercuryrelated health benefits of the regulation alone exceeded the costs. Here, the
agency’s argument was based on Chevron Step 2: the EPA argued that the
statute was ambiguous, and thus the agency was entitled to deference in its
interpretation excluding co-benefits. In its repeal of the Clean Power Plan, by
contrast, the EPA operated at Chevron Step 1: it argued that the statute
unambiguously prohibited the agency from regulating in the manner dictated
by the Clean Power Plan, cost-benefit consequences notwithstanding. These
two approaches are species of the same genus. In both cases, the agency used
an interpretation of the Clean Air Act to escape the consequences of its costbenefit analysis. Below, we analyze these two efforts in depth.
A.

Chevronizing around CBA at Step 2: The Cases of Mercury and Fuel
Economy
1.

Mercury

As we explained above, the section of the Clean Air Act under which
the Obama EPA regulated mercury requires that regulation be “appropriate
and necessary.” The Trump EPA argued that this language was ambiguous;
that the EPA now interpreted the language to exclude consideration of cobenefits; and that the EPA’s interpretation was entitled to deference under
Chevron Step 2.
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This flavor of the Chevronizing strategy is potentially powerful
because regulatory statutes are frequently ambiguous. This ambiguity creates
interpretive space for the agency under Chevron, space that the agency can
use to craft a legal interpretation that excludes benefits or costs. “Appropriate
and necessary” is a paradigmatic example.114 Still, an agency’s authority
under Chevron is not limitless. Even if a statute is ambiguous, Step 2 of the
Chevron framework nonetheless requires that that the executive branch’s
interpretation of ambiguous language be “reasonable.”115
The meaning of this term has given rise to much scholarly debate.
Some scholars have taken the position that Chevron’s two steps both call for
statutory construction: Step One asks “whether the text of the agency’s
governing statute nullifies the agency’s position,” while Step Two asks
“whether other conventional tools of construction cast doubt on the agency’s
position.”116 Others have suggested that Chevron Step 2 calls for a more
substantive type of review, possibly “arbitrary and capricious” review under
the APA.117 This version of Chevron Step 2 would direct a court to scrutinize
the policy choices underlying the agency’s action, rather than merely
engaging in a legalistic analysis of the agency’s statutory interpretation.118
Empirical studies of Chevron have shown that appellate courts subscribe to
each of these interpretations at various times.119
Here, if Chevron Step 2 were given any sort of substantive content,
we suspect that it would be fatal to the Trump EPA’s repeal of mercury
regulations.120 That deregulation would create billions of dollars in net costs,
114

Though the Supreme Court has held that it requires the agency to take costs into account.
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–08 (2015).
115
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
116
See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1278–80 (1997); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss,
Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 614 (2009); Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too
Confusing—Let's Call Them Chevron Space and Skidmore Weight, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1143, 1165 (2012).
117
Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359,
2383 (2018); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned DecisionMaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 127, 131
(1994). Still other scholars have argued that Chevron has only one step. Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Verneule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
118
Sharkey, supra note 117, at 2383.
119
Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 638–40 (2014); Kent
Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34–
35 (2017).
120
It is worth noting that, across a wide variety of legal contexts, courts will sometimes treat
the word “reasonable” as if it requires a comparison between costs and benefits. For
examples from federal regulatory law, see Tracy Bateman Farrell, et. al, 45A Am. Jur. 2d
Job Discrimination § 200 (2019) (when determining whether an accommodation is

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538456

9-Feb-20]

CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA

25

and no identified non-monetary benefit that might justify such a loss. That
hardly seems reasonable, or for that matter “appropriate and necessary.”121
There is a related problem with the EPA’s interpretation that renders
it unreasonable. On its view, the Trump EPA is allowed to limit pollution that
generates mercury-related harms and pollution that generates particulate
matter-related harms but cannot count both harms when evaluating a
regulation that does both. It is hard to think of a justification for such an
approach and the Trump administration does not supply one.
The problem with the EPA’s stance is that it could compel the agency
to engage in unnecessarily wasteful regulation. Imagine that EPA is
considering a rule that limits emissions from factories. The anticipated rule
imposes costs of $1 billion on businesses, and results in lower emissions of
two substances, X and Y. Suppose further that the X reduction produces
benefits of $0.9 billion and the Y reduction produces benefits of $0.8 billion.
The rule passes a cost-benefit analysis because the joint benefits of $1.7
billion exceed the $1 billion cost.

reasonable under the ADA, “courts are permitted to take into account the reasonableness of
the cost of any necessary workplace accommodation, the availability of alternatives therefor,
or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy,” and an
employer does not need to provide an accommodation if doing so would be “unduly costly,
extensive, substantial, or disruptive”); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 512 n.30 (1981) (requirement that the Consumer Product Safety Commission
promulgate rules that are “reasonably necessary” to eliminate an “unreasonable risk” of
injury require “a generalized balancing of costs and benefits”); Barbara J. Van Arsdale, et.
al, 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 403 (2019) (“An accommodation is reasonable under the
Fair Housing Act if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it.”). For
examples from tort law, see McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1558 (7th Cir.
1987) (“Ordinarily the innkeeper knows much more about the hazards of his trade than the
guest, and can take reasonable (=cost-justified) steps to reduce them, while ordinarily the
guest can do little to protect himself against them.”); see also United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947) (L. Hand, J.); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
City of Jackson, 493 So.2d 955, 960 n. 3 (Miss.1986); People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266–67 (1985); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 386 (1976); 3 Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts § 16.9, at pp. 467–68 (2d ed.
1986); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 31, at p. 173 (5th ed. 1984); East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986). For examples from property
law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (land use is unreasonable if “the gravity of the
harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct” or if “the harm caused by the conduct is
serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would
not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible”); Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc.,
510 N.W.2d 41 (Neb. 1994); Michael Allen Wolf, 12 Powell on Real Property § 79C.06
(2019) (in the context of evaluating zoning changes, “courts have generally tried to balance
the public gain from the particular provision against the private loss sustained by the property
owner”).
121
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2712.
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Now further suppose that two different laws authorize EPA to
regulate X and Y. Call these laws law-X and law-Y. Each law imposes
different substantive standards: EPA may regulate X only if “appropriate and
necessary,” while EPA my regulate Y only if regulation “serves the public
interest.” Instead of issuing one regulation to reduce emissions of both X and
Y, the EPA could issue separate regulations of X (under law-X) and Y (under
law-Y). However, regulation X alone would impose costs of $0.7 billion, and
regulation Y alone would impose costs of $0.6 billion, for a total of $1.3
billion. It would thus be optimal for the EPA to regulate both chemicals with
a single rule.
Suppose that a court held that the statutory language is ambiguous and
the EPA deserved Chevron deference. The EPA then decided to interpret the
statute to exclude co-benefits and bar the single regulation. Would a court
hold that the EPA’s regulation was reasonable at Chevron Step 2?
We are pretty sure the answer is “no.” The standards “appropriate and
necessary” and “the public interest” do not exclude considerations of cobenefits but on the contrary invite the agency to take into account all relevant
effects of the regulation. Excluding co-benefits from the analysis would push
the agency toward inefficient alternatives and block regulations that would
benefit public welfare. We do not think one can reasonably interpret these
standards to require EPA to exclude co-benefits. Put more generally, it would
seem unreasonable for an agency to select—as a matter of that agency’s
discretion—a legal interpretation that compels the agency to act wastefully
or inefficiently. Deliberately exercising agency discretion in order to achieve
unnecessarily wasteful ends seems the antithesis of reasonableness.
To test this intuition, let us consider some more extreme cases.
Imagine that EPA regulates under law-X and the co-benefit is now something
over which the EPA has no authority. Let’s imagine that EPA could prove
that the co-benefit is reducing violent crime. Industry argues that EPA cannot
take this co-benefit into account and therefore that the regulation should be
struck down because the costs exceed the authorized benefits.
Industry is wrong. EPA should take into account reductions in violent
crime—or, more precisely, reductions in deaths, injuries, and property loss—
as long as a causal relationship between the emissions and violent crime can
be established. The goal of regulation should be to increase overall social
welfare. This requires analyzing all of the effects of a regulation, not merely
the intended effects or those specifically named by the statute.
We can make this point in another way by imagining the regulation
produces costs rather than benefits, for example, by increasing violent crime.
(We might call this effect a “co-cost.”) EPA would be on firm ground if it put
the relevant outcomes into a cost-benefit analysis and regulated (or chose not
to regulate) on its own. The issue is not whether the regulation produces
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benefits or costs by affecting behavior that the underlying statute did not seek
to influence; the issue is whether the benefits and costs are actually borne by
the relevant group of people, in a way that is clear and measurable.
This last point is worth emphasizing. Virtually all regulations affect
behaviors across many dimensions. A pollution-control regulation will
typically reduce many types of emissions, not just one, and it would be
strange for the agency to ignore the effects of the other types of emissions—
good or bad—just because it acts based on a statute that regulates only the
one. The same regulation could, by increasing the cost of goods produced by
the factor, have a range of other effects—on the safety of produces that are
built with the factory’s inputs, on employment, on working conditions in the
factory. Similarly, regulation of fuel economy standards will affect the
amount of fuel consumed and the price of automobiles, but as we have seen
it will also affect pollution, traffic fatalities, and more. These effects are
unavoidable, so if the agency is not allowed to take them into account, its
regulations will often cause great harm. Indeed, the vast majority of costs and
benefits that figure into the Trump administration’s CBA of its fuel economy
standards are actually co-costs and co-benefits: increased or reduced traffic
fatalities, environmental harms, and so forth.122 Yet the Trump administration
has continued to consider co-costs and co-benefits in this context without any
recognition that it is acting inconsistently with its approach to mercury.
The Trump EPA hedges a bit in its defense of repealing the mercury
regulation by suggesting a more restricted version of its rule against taking
account of co-benefits. It argues that the problem with the mercury regulation
is that the “primary” benefit is the reduction of non-mercury emissions. We
can see the force of this argument by considering a semi-hypothetical
example. Imagine that EPA wants to reduce cigarette smoking because of its
public health effects and so issues an environmental regulation that puts a
limit on how much cigarette smoke a person may produce. (We will assume
that the EPA can find a statute somewhere that gives it authority to do this.)
Then the EPA conducts a cost-benefit analysis and virtually all the benefits
come from the avoidance of deaths of smokers themselves rather than from
second-hand smoke “pollution” caused by their “emissions.” It is evident that
the agency is trying to regulate in a way outside its authority—which here
belongs to the FDA. A fair interpretation of the authorizing statutes suggests
that EPA may not regulate cigarette smoking, and it cannot avoid this
restriction by purporting to regulate smoke emissions.
One can imagine a similar argument even when an agency issues rules
that affect outcomes within its jurisdiction. Imagine that Congress tells EPA
to strictly regulate mercury emissions but to regulate particulate matter
122

See supra Part II.A.
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emissions with a light touch. EPA then issues a regulation that strictly
regulates both types of emissions and justifies the regulation with a costbenefit analysis in which the effects on particulate matter play the dominant
role. Here, an argument could be made that EPA acted improperly. But our
case is, if anything, the opposite. The standard for regulating particulate
matter emissions is “requisite to protect the public health,”123 and the
Supreme Court has held that this requires the EPA to regulate particulate
matter emissions without regard to cost124—which is to say, even more
stringently than it regulates mercury.125
It is important to emphasize that if this provision of the Clean Air Act
unambiguously barred consideration of co-benefits, then the EPA would be
obligated (at Chevron Step 1) not to consider them in its regulatory decisions.
This is the position the Trump EPA has taken with respect to the Clean Power
Plan, which we discuss below. But this is not the Trump EPA’s view of the
statute authorizing it to regulate mercury, and we suspect it is highly unlikely
that a court would ever hold that “appropriate and necessary” unambiguously
bars consideration of co-benefits.126 Here, the Trump EPA’s refusal to take
co-benefits into account is the agency’s own choice—an exercise of the
agency’s policy discretion. The agency is deliberately selecting an
interpretation that will force it to create more costs than benefits. Such an
attempt to Chevronize around cost-benefit analysis should not be deemed
“reasonable.”
2.

Fuel economy

The EPA and NHTSA’s claims to Chevron deference in the
withdrawal of California’s Clean Air Act waiver raise different issues.
Consider first the EPA’s argument that California does not face “compelling

123

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 466-67 (2001).
125
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 (“American Trucking thus establishes the modest
principle that where the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a
factor that on its face does not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly
allowing the Agency to consider cost anyway. That principle has no application here.
“Appropriate and necessary” is a far more comprehensive criterion than “requisite to protect
the public health”; read fairly and in context, as we have explained, the term plainly
subsumes consideration of cost.”).
126
In another case, the D.C. Circuit approved the EPA’s reliance on co-benefits. See United
States Sugar Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 830 F.3d 579, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016), on reh’g en
banc, 671 F. App’x 822 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en banc in part, 671 F. App’x 824
(D.C. Cir. 2016). If the Obama EPA exercised its discretion properly to consider co-benefits,
then the Trump EPA’s reversal, without any explanation based on policy considerations,
seems arbitrary.
124
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and extraordinary conditions” that necessitate a waiver.127 The EPA argued
that “the term ‘extraordinary’ should refer to circumstances that are specific
to California.”128 “Extraordinary” means “going beyond what is usual,
regular, or customary,” or “exceptional,”129 and the statute is specifically
meant to allow waivers for particular states but not others. 130 Accordingly,
EPA’s interpretation of the statute appears at minimum reasonable, and it is
perhaps even the best interpretation of the statute.
What is more dubious is EPA’s claim that “while effects related to
climate change in California could be substantial, they are not sufficiently
different from the conditions in the nation as a whole to justify separate State
standards.”131 California is certainly not the only state to have been affected
by climate change. But it has been affected in a manner—among other things,
the outbreak of vast wildfires, accompanied by power blackouts meant to
reduce the incidence of such fires—that is different and arguably more severe
than most other states.132 Even though the EPA is entitled to Chevron
deference as to its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, its conclusion that
California does not meet the terms of the statute is subject to arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA.133 As we have noted, arbitrary and
capricious review is often—though not always—quite limited.134 But if a
court conducts a more searching inquiry, we suspect that the EPA’s
determination is unlikely to survive.
With respect to the conflict between the Clean Air Act and the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, the outcome is equally uncertain. The EPCA
explicitly requires NHTSA to take into account “the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy” when setting fuel
economy standards.135 Courts have held that when the EPA grants California
a preemption waiver, this waiver effectively transforms California’s fuel
economy standards into federal standards and requires that NHTSA take them

127

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 89, at 51,341.
129
Extraordinary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/extraordinary (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
130
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
131
SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 89, at 51,342.
132
Tim Arango, Jose A. Del Real & Ivan Penn, Five Lessons We Learned from the
California
Wildfires,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/us/fires-california.html.
133
5 U.S.C. § 706.
134
Compare Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 1358, 1362 (finding that the
overwhelming majority of agency decisions survive “arbitrary and capricious” challenges at
the Supreme Court), with Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 82, at 382-84 (finding higher rates of
reversal in the lower courts).
135
49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
128
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into account.136 It was on this basis that two federal courts held that the EPCA
does not preempt states from promulgating fuel economy regulations
pursuant to EPA waiver.137 Once California has obtained an EPA waiver, its
standards have the status of federal regulations, and the EPCA does not block
them.
Of course, these cases were decided in the presence of federal
agencies that were favorably inclined toward the state regulations at issue.
The federal government was not a party to either lawsuit, and the courts do
not make reference to Chevron deference or the agencies’ position. But it is
nonetheless entirely possible that those cases could have come out differently
had the courts been required to defer to reasonable agency constructions of
the statutes. That, in turn, again raises the question of whether an agency
interpretation of a statute can be reasonable under Chevron Step 2 if it
compels the agency to take an action that is not cost-benefit justified. An
honest cost-benefit analysis, had EPA and NHTSA been required to produce
one, would likely show that denying California a Clean Air Act waiver
creates costs in excess of benefits. Yet here, because no cost-benefit analysis
was produced, it will be challenging for a court to puncture EPA and
NHTSA’s result. It is thus possible that the withdrawal of California’s waiver
will survive a court challenge.
B.

Chevronizing around CBA at Step 1: The Clean Power Plan

As with its approach to repealing the mercury regulation, the Trump
administration’s strategy with regard to repealing the Clean Power Plan
represents a type of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the administration
was faced with an unfavorable CBA: however much it attempted to massage
the numbers, its analysis revealed that repealing the CPP would create huge
net costs (and lead to many unnecessary deaths).138 In response, the Trump
EPA took the position that its hands were tied—the Clean Air Act allowed
only regulations that could be applied to a single power plant, not regulation
of the overall mixture of fuel sources used in a state.139 In advancing this
argument, the EPA did not claim that it was entitled to deference under

136

Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1168–69, 1172.
Id. at 1172; Crombie, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 348–50. The courts held, in the alternative, that
the EPCA’s preemption provision should be read very narrowly, and that it did not preempt
the state fuel economy standards. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75; Crombie, 520 F.
Supp. 2d at 330–35.
138
See supra notes 45–51and accompanying text.
139
Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 51, at 32,556. See also supra notes 47–52 and
accompanying text.
137
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Chevron. Instead, it argued that the statute unambiguously prohibited
regulation of the type employed in the Clean Power Plan.140
On its own terms, this is a dubious conclusion. Recall that the Clean
Air Act requires the EPA to implement the “best system of emission
reduction.”141 The word “system” is amenable to a wide variety of
interpretations.142 The standard definition of the word would include largescale plans that would favor some types of energy production over others.143
In addition, the Clean Air Act never states explicitly that the only permissible
standards are those that can be applied within boundaries of each regulated
source. The Trump EPA infers this from the words “existing source” and
“application,” but that is not the only reasonable interpretation of those
words, particularly when they are read in context with the phrase “system of
emission reduction.”
Nonetheless, one can see why the Trump EPA adopted this legal
strategy. This version of Chevronizing around CBA at Step 1—if it were
upheld by the courts—would serve three overlapping purposes for the Trump
administration. First, it would justify the agency’s decision to repeal the CPP
despite the fact that the CPP creates benefits well in excess of costs. It would
also insulate the repeal decision from “arbitrary and capricious” review under
the APA: if the CPP is unlawful, it cannot be arbitrary and capricious to repeal
it. Second, it would bind the hands of any future EPA, operating under a
different president, that might attempt to reinstate the CPP. If the Clean Air
Act is unambiguous, the views of any given EPA as to the statute’s meaning
are irrelevant.144 Third, this approach does not require the EPA to argue that
the statute is ambiguous and that its interpretation—which would generate
greater costs than benefits—is reasonable. As we suggested in the prior
section, courts may be reluctant to accept as reasonable a discretionary
interpretation that produces costs in excess of benefits and forecloses the

Id. at 32,527 (“After reconsidering the relevant statutory text, structure, and purpose, the
Agency now recognizes that Congress ‘‘spoke to the precise question’’ of the scope of CAA
section 111(a)(1) and clearly precluded the unsupportable reading of that provision asserted
in the CPP. Accordingly, this action repeals the CPP.”). See also supra notes 54–55 and
accompanying text.
141
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
142
Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 51, at 32,528.
143
See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/system
(defining “system” as “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a
unified whole”).
144
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (“ If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”).
140
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most efficient options.145 Here, the EPA has attempted to escape that bind by
arguing that it possesses no interpretive discretion.146
Arguing that an interpretation is permitted under Chevron (as in the
case of mercury) creates different types of legal risks than arguing that an
interpretation is mandated by an unambiguous statute (as with the CPP).147
But in both cases, an agency that does not have a strong argument on policy
grounds for repealing existing regulations has resorted to a legal
interpretation as a mechanism for evading CBA.

CONCLUSION
The Trump administrations’ deregulatory project exposes some
serious tensions in the structure of the administrative state. On the one hand,
a tradition of judicial deference to the executive, exemplified by the Chevron
doctrine, suggests that when the governing statute is ambiguous, courts will
(or should) give Trump a free hand to roll back regulation. Congress gave the
president discretion over policy, and the question whether to regulate or
deregulate falls within that policy discretion. Courts should therefore defer to
the president’s policy judgments. On the other hand, the rise of cost-benefit
analysis suggests that courts should push back against the executive branch
when its regulatory decisions violate a cost-benefit test, even if the relevant
statutory language is broad and ambiguous. The president’s choice whether
to regulate or deregulate any particular industry is therefore constrained by
facts about the world—people’s preferences and the costs of regulatory
compliance—which the president is required to respect.
We see three ways to resolve this tension. First, one could grab the
Chevron horn of the dilemma, and argue that in the presence of an ambiguous
statute, the executive branch can do what it wants, cost-benefit analysis
notwithstanding. Indeed, the cost-benefit requirement itself began as an
initiative by the executive branch, and only later was enforced by courts, and
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still only sporadically.148 The Trump administration could argue that what the
president giveth, the president mayeth take away. But at minimum, this
window of discretion appears to be narrowing. Courts have increasingly
found an unambiguous cost-benefit requirement in the statutory language that
agencies are required to enforce.149 If this trend continues, executive
discretion will further erode. We suspect that the sloppy cost-benefit analyses
used by the Trump administration will be rejected by the courts as arbitrary
and capricious, further strengthening this emerging cost-benefit norm.
Second, one could go the other direction, and argue that executive
branch administrative discretion is a myth, or is becoming one. Even where
statutory language is ambiguous, the executive must comply with cost-benefit
analysis, or perhaps even maximize social welfare, and courts will push back
if it does not. But this view raises numerous difficult (as well as familiar)
questions. Do the courts have the capacity to second-guess the judgments of
experts in the regulatory agencies?150 Many such judgments involve technical
questions, including, for example, which of a number of conflicting studies
is most credible, and how valuations should be extrapolated from limited
data. Courts are notoriously skittish, probably for good reason, about
overruling the executive’s judgment with regard to technical issues over
which the courts have substantially less expertise, even though technical
analyses can be misused to determine outcomes preferred for political
reasons.
Third, one might find a middle way. One possibility is that the
executive’s discretion is at a maximum when it chooses whether to regulate
and how much, and at a minimum when it seeks to eliminate or curtail
existing regulations. Consider, for example, the choice whether to issue a
strict regulation and a moderate regulation. Imagine that both regulations pass
a cost-benefit analysis in the sense of being preferable to the status quo, but
they generate different wealth levels and perhaps distributional
consequences, and involve different levels of uncertainty about
consequences. Under existing law, a court is likely to defer to the choice of
the executive, and this may well be the proper approach as well. By contrast,
if an executive seeks to replace an earlier modest regulation with a strict
regulation, or a strict regulation with a modest regulation (or none at all), a
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court should be more likely to insist that the revision be cost-justified.151
Experience with the status quo regulation, and the economic analysis and
related materials that the government had used to justify the regulation, may
give a court the information it needs to review the regulatory reform.
Whatever the preferred solution, our main point is to argue that when
a statute neither unambiguously permits or prohibits cost-benefit analysis, the
tradition of Chevron deference and the emerging cost-benefit norm are in
tension, and one will have to give. The Trump administration has laid bare
the contradiction by so obviously trying to use Chevron to evade cost-benefit
analysis, and now courts will have to decide what to do. The tension reflects
an underlying theoretical uncertainty about how much discretion the
executive should have over public policy—whether courts should curtail that
discretion, and, if so, to what degree. This tension is also reflected in the
efforts by commentators and some judges to revive the nondelegation
doctrine, which would require Congress to curtail the discretion of the
executive by engaging in regulation itself rather than delegating regulatory
authority to agencies.152 The problem with the nondelegation doctrine is that
it imposes on Congress a burden for which it lacks institutional capacity
because of the highly complex and ever-changing challenges of regulation.153
A cost-benefit norm that constrained the executive without imposing new
burdens on Congress may be the solution to this problem.
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